Decentralisation has been an influential procedure for public sector reform for decades. Like many countries in Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand have experienced the transitional period of decentralisation since the 1990s, but its results are considered to be poor, allowing the increasing corruption associated with local elites. This paper will address the problem by focusing on human resource management (HRM), in particular recruitment and selection, in decentralised local governments. Theoretical backgrounds of decentralisation reform are reviewed to highlight how significant the topic is in considering the current situation, and empirical observations are presented from two countries and four case cities, which are followed by a comparative analysis across observations. Findings of the paper include not only rooted differences of policy arrangements in the two countries, but also favourable evidences at the local level that cannot be explained by the existing theories. These findings lead to both academic and practical implications and future research tasks.
Introduction
Over the past several decades, decentralisation has been a worldwide trend (Löffler, 2003) . In Western developed countries, decentralisation is promoted as a means to streamline government administration under ever--tightening fiscal constraints and as a response to public dissatisfaction with inefficient and unresponsive government bureaucracy (Burns et al., 1994) . Such a trend has also been presented as a part of a wider administration reform movement, namely New Public Management (NPM), in which private sector practices are introduced to the public sector (Hughes, 2003) . The trend was "transferred" (Common, 1998) to other parts of the world -developing and transitional countries -partly as a result of the encouragement of international donors (Litvack et al., 1998) .
While the process of decentralisation was intended to make local governments more effective and responsive to the local population, and may have opened a way to achieve such purposes, serious downsides to decentralisation are also reported. Particularly in developing and transitional countries, monopoly on power by local elites is the frequently reported problem (Charlick, 2001 , Devas and Grant, 2003 , Litvack et al., 1998 , Peters, 2001a , Turner and Hulme, 1997 . Decentralised local governments in these countries are said to be dominated by traditional local bosses, rather than being more responsive to their poor constituencies.
In this regard, one of the crucial drawbacks of decentralised local governments may be in the human resource management (HRM) system of the local civil service. Because of the poorly designed HRM system, or problems in its implementation, the local civil service does not function as it was expected to. Among a range of HRM practices, recruitment and selection is considered to be particularly significant, because it is in these areas that the power of local bosses commonly interferes. Indeed, the local civil service is often selected through the nepotism of local power holders, which, in turn, makes the capacities of the civil service even weaker. The HRM aspect of decentralisation is, however, paid less attention compared with fiscal concern of the reform (Gramlich, 1993 , Turner et al., 2009 , Zhang and Zou, 1998 .
To further address these issues, our paper will introduce empirical cases in two developing countries: the Philippines and Thailand. As both are located in Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand provide contrasting cases. In the Philippines, decentralisation reform went into full swing under a democratic movement of its citizens in the early 1990s, preceding other countries in the region. On the other hand, Thailand introduced decentralisation at the end of the 1990s as a revolutionary reform for the unitary kingdom, mainly as the result of fiscal considerations. In both countries, however, the local chief executives were provided excessive power to influence many aspects of local governance, including HRM of the local civil service, and exercised their authorities against the initial intentions of the reform. Given such a situation, the responses of the two countries seem to be different. While the government of Thailand may be directed to shift their policies towards 're--centralisation', moving some of the decision--making power back to the central level, the Philippines has continued to promote decentralisation up to the present day and is likely to do so in the future. The perspective of this paper is not limited to a comparative analysis of the institutional arrangements of the two countries, but also includes an empirical analysis at the local level, which has hardly been included in the preceding literatures. This paper first portrays the underpinning theoretical backgrounds of the research and adopted methodologies. After that, empirical observations from the Philippines and Thailand are presented respectively. Then, a comparative analysis is made across two countries and four case cities, which is followed by concluding remarks that consider the academic and practical implications of the findings in this paper.
Does Recruitment and Selection Matter in Decentralised Local Government? Research Backgrounds and Methodologies

Background Academic Arguments
Before moving on to the empirical analysis, this section will present an overview of the background of this paper in regards to its main topic. Recruitment practices in decentralised local governments have had a place in preceding academic discourses, and it is important to ensure the significance of examining that issue. To start with, conceptual relations between decentralisation and the NPM--associated reform should be considered. As mentioned already, decentralisation reform has been promoted partly through the international movement of the NPM. The NPM is usually explained "as being a bundle of concepts" (Löffler, 2003:480) or as providing a "menu of choices rather than a single option" (Manning, 2001:298) , which differentiates new types of approaches of the public sector from the traditional administration. Theoretical bases of the NPM debates are considered to be new institutionalism and managerialism (Hood, 1991 , Hood, 1994 , Hughes, 2003 . The new institutionalism and its associated theories, such as the public choice and its associated theories, the transaction cost theory and the principal--agent theory, support what is called the new right movement by the political right across Western governments, which is typified by marketisation and/or privatisation of public services. Meanwhile, ideas of managerialism emerged with the influence of international scientific management movements and promotes the universal applicability of management techniques.
The main concepts of the NPM can be summarised as shown below (Holmes and Shand, 1995 , Hughes, 2003 , Löffler, 2003 , Manning, 2001 , Pollitt, 1995 . 1
• A greater attention to results as presented in the introduction of performance management in which clear objectives and performance indicators are set
• Decentralisation of authorities to lower level organisations • Flexibilities and devolutions in financial management and personnel management
• Increased responsiveness to citizens as customers of public services along with an emphasis on accountabilities and transparency
• Introduction of market mechanisms into public service deliveries (e.g. internal markets, user charges and contracting out)
• Privatizations and associated reduction of government functions These concepts of the NPM captured "the structural, organizational and managerial changes" (Larbi, 1998:189) that have been observed in the public sector of most Western countries since the late 1970s.
The influence of these NPM concepts on civil service reform by applying the HRM practices of the private sector to public organisations is not a new phenomenon. For instance, Taylor (1992:197) indicated samples of "best practices" of HRM in the private sector that might be exported to the public sector:
• The development of open and participative performance appraisal systems • Basing immediate rewards and long--term promotion on merit and performance rather than on seniority
• The adoption of recruitment procedures whose primary objective is to recruit the right person rather than ensure that all sections and interested parties have a say in the decision
• Introduction of initiatives relating to improving communication, involvement and participation of employees Indeed, these trends can be identified in a recent comparative analysis of the civil service management by the Organisation for Economic Co--operation and Development (OECD) across its member OECD countries (OECD, 2008) . This OECD report illustrates that an increasing number of countries have introduced performance--related pay to the civil service, and more and more authorities concerning civil service management have devolved to the managers of lower levels of government organisations.
As discussed so far, decentralisation is a key component of the NPM, and as Larbi (1998:189) described, its "introduction and application in the public domain is part of the efforts to 'debureaucratize' public services or 'delayer' the hierarchies within them". Having acknowledged this point, however, it is important to note that the term decentralisation might mean something different in Western countries and developing countries. In industrialised countries, where the NPM was originated, decentralisation is considered in a more managerial sense, "giving line managers in government departments and agencies greater authority and responsibility" (Polidano, 2001:55) and the political sense of decentralisation through which authorities are devolved to local government is normally not involved in a menu of public management reform (Larbi, 1998 , Polidano, 2001 ). On the other hand, in developing countries, decentralisation in a political sense is often taken as an integral part of the NPM reform and the distinction between these two is often absent (Polidano, 2001) .
What makes arguments on decentralisation more complex is that the concept attracts wide support of those with different intensions. More precisely, in addition to the NPM supporters, which consists of the political right and managerialism opponents, the proponents of the political left are also in favour of decentralisation, in the political sense in particular, for very different reasons: as a means to promote democratic participation and to oppose centralised policy control under conservative governments. In the developing contexts, such an ideological dimension of decentralisation reform perfectly fits the concept of 'good governance', which came to be emphasised by international donor agencies in the 1990s (Common, 1998) . Hence, decentralisation reform -containing both political and managerial devolution of authorities -has been a queen of reform in these countries, being "imbued with many positive connotations" (Turner and Hulme, 1997:151 ).
Yet, although the NPM advocates highlighted global convergence of the reform (Holmes and Shand, 1995 , Osborne and Gaebler, 1992 , Osborne and Plastrik, 1997 , applicability of the NPM reform, including 'decentralisation' in developing countries, has been in doubt by various authors. Amongst such disputes, one serious concern is the problem of corruption as a result of increased discretionary power of public sector organisations or civil servants (Elcock and Minogue, 2001 , Hughes, 2003 , Manning, 2001 , McCourt, 2001b , Polidano et al., 1998 , Polidano, 2001 , Schick, 1998 As a cause of such failures of the reform, preconditions of these countries are often pointed out (Charlick, 2001 , Crook, 2003 , Devas and Grant, 2003 , Peters, 2001 , Schick, 1998 . Particularly issues of corruption, morale and discipline of the officers are the primary concerns. Manning (2001) claims developing countries lack 'old public disciplines' with which predictive budget, credible policy--making process and behavioural standards of civil servants are assured. Similarly, Polidano et al. (1998:287) argue that "the missing ingredients" are not formal rules and regulations but "norms of conduct: bureaucracy in the classic Weberian rather than the everyday sense".
In the political culturists' way of understanding, social or cultural norms of these countries may be considered as the underlying problem. In the case of the Philippines, beliefs emphasised in the Filipino culture, such as Utang na loób, a debt of gratitude and Compadrazgo, ritual kinship with charismatic local leaders, are often referred to as promoters of paternalistic relations between local elites and the population (Landé, 2001) . Similarly in Thailand, Kreng Jai, obedience to others, Bun Khun, the reciprocity of gratitude, and Mai pen rai, not taking misconducts seriously, are culturally appreciated phases that influence social relations in the country (Kamoche, 2000) .
On the other hand, from perspectives of institutionalists, it may be explained by the problem of structural arrangements in the government. As Taylor (1992) precisely analysed, the NPM reform was initiated to the countries in which administrative bureaucracy in its Weberian sense, controlled by rules and regulations and equipped with "generalist" bureaucrats that have basic capacities and "a smattering of common sense", had been established. Considering the fact that the present developing countries do not have such preconditions, the administrative model of public organisations, along with the managerial model, cannot be abandoned.
These arguments on the NPM reform are rightly aligned with the critical arguments on political decentralisation. As mentioned earlier, undesirable exercise of devolved authorities by monopolies of local elites are of concern (Charlick, 2001 , Devas and Grant, 2003 , Litvack et al., 1998 , Peters, 2001a , Turner and Hulme, 1997 and explained either from patron-client perspectives within the country's socio--cultural contexts (Landé, 2001) or from institutional perspectives within the country's socio--economic contexts (Sidel, 1999 (Sidel, , 2004 .
Recognising the significance of morale and discipline of the local civil service in considering unsuccessful evidences of decentralisation, this paper problematizes the civil service management, or HRM functions of decentralised local government. Then, why does recruitment and selection matter? In managerial theories of HRM, recruitment and selection is highly regarded amongst other HRM practices because it is the crucial entrance point to capture its staff, an "organisation's most important asset" (Cook, 2009:1) . Recruitment and selection are uninterrupted processes that take place one after another (Newell, 2005, Lievens and Chapman, 2009) . Recruitment is vital in terms of attracting qualified, competent or appropriate people as indicated in the organisation's job analysis (Martineau et al., 2003 , Peterson, 1963 . Afterwards, selection would be the stage in which organisations choose and allocate a person to the right position in order for the organisation to function. Therefore, the entrance to any gate of an organisation is extremely important. A range of researches has proven that recruiting the 'right' person would contribute to the organisation's overall performance (for example, Hunter and Hunter, 1984) . Although not being discussed further in this paper, validities of recruitment and selection methods have also been actively researched, mainly by psychologists, which reflects the expansion of optional approaches in recruitment and selection in the private enterprises (Cook, 2009 ). In the development context, recruitment and selection is the very area where corrupt conduct commonly interferes. The World Bank found a correlation between merit--based recruitment and the absence of corruption (World Bank, 1997) , which was followed by more attention paid to recruitment as a factor of nepotism (McCourt, 2001a) . Despite of its significance, empirical researches on recruitment and selection in decentralised local government are still limited.
As such, this paper attempts to present empirical observations of the issue from two countries and to make a comparative analysis across the countries and their local governments. The perspectives obtained in the paper are expected to contribute to further arguments on HRM in local civil service and on decentralisation reform, including those of culturalists and institutionalists presented in preceding literatures.
Case Profiles and Methodologies in Field Research
The Philippines and Thailand were chosen as research fields considering the differences of backgrounds of decentralisation reform in these countries despite being closely located in Southeast Asia. First, timings of the reform differed in these two countries, as the World Bank classified the Philippines as a "fast starter" and Thailand as a "cautious mover" in terms of decentralisation reform (World Bank, 2005:6--7) . While the Philippines introduced the full--swing reform in 1991, decentralisation--related legislation of Thailand was enacted in 1997, the contents of which were more conservative compared with the legislation of the Philippines. Second, the histories of local governments in these countries are considered to be different. Recent research on the Philippines' history revealed that local government had been enjoying a certain amount of autonomy even under colonial rule (Hutchcroft, 2000) , while Thailand is the only country in the region that has maintained independence as a united kingdom with strong central control. Third, political intentions behind the reform were not the same in these two countries. Decentralisation in the Philippines was promoted as a means of political democratisation under the Aquino administration. In Thailand, on the other hand, the reform was more about solving fiscal constraints of the country.
The comparative analysis of this paper will first examine the differences of centrallocal arrangements on the civil service management under decentralisation, in particular recruitment and selection, between the two countries. Then, a comparison between case local governments across these countries follows. In both countries, two provincial cities were selected as cases because the city or municipality level of local governments is the main service provider both in the Philippines and Thailand. Provincial cities or municipalities rather than rural governments were considered because of research feasibilities and the facts that rural local governments tend to be behind in terms of HR practice implementation. City B and City D were selected first, as they are renowned as award--winning governments in terms of local governance in their respective countries. Then, City A and City C were chosen to be compared with City B and City D. In the Philippines, City A was picked from the same region as City B, considering the socio--cultural diversity of the country, while in Thailand City C was selected from the urban area of another province. Information was collected in these case cities through qualitative field researches by the authors. They included extensive documentary review, in--depth individual interviews with local civil servants as well as mayors, and focus group discussions.
Empirical Observations in the Philippines
Practices of Recruitment and Selection in Decentralised Local Government
In the Philippines, decentralisation reform went into full swing at the time of enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) in 1991. The LGC was implemented under the administration of Cory Aquino (president 1986-1992) , who emerged from the so--called EDSA Revolution, or the 'Peoples' Power Movement', after the downfall of the autocratic regime of Ferdinand Marcos (president 1966-1986) . In fact, decentralisation was on Aquino's political agenda from the start. The constitution, which was established in 1987, 4 already included provisions for local autonomy.
Hence, much of the LGC contains institutional arrangements on peoples' participation at the local level. 3 City C and City D are actually called 'municipalities' in Thailand but both are classified as urban municipalities. Therefore, they are referred to as 'cities' in this paper for the sake of simplicity.
The LGC provided broad transfers of responsibilities for basic service delivery and of associated regulatory powers to Local Government Units (LGUs). In a radical shift, service sectors previously provided by the national government agencies and their regional offices -health, social services, environment and natural resources and agriculture -were all devolved to LGUs. Amongst three tiers of LGUs defined in the LGC, barangay, city or municipality, and province, cities and municipalities came to be a main service provider to the residents supervised by provinces. In addition, the authority of local governments was also enhanced to undertake an income--generating function as well as development functions that had not been engaged. In a fiscal aspect, greater taxation power through local fees and charges was devolved to LGUs, 5 and a share of the national taxes, distributed to LGUs as Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA), was also increased from 11% to 40%. 6 Responsibility for HRM of local government personnel, including those transferred from the national government working in the newly devolved sectors, were also devolved to the local chief executive, who is elected directly by the local constituencies under the supervision by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) of the national government. 7 The LGC defines that the chief executive is responsible for human resources and their development in its LGU and should take all personnel actions in accordance with the constitutional provisions on civil service, pertinent laws and associated rules and regulations, including policies, guidelines and standards that the CSC may establish. 8
As for recruitment and selection, applicants for the regular staff of local government offices are required to go through the competitive examination implemented by CSC, so as to secure the minimum quality of local civil services. Nonetheless, the examination assesses mental capacities rather than knowledge and, according to anecdotal informants, it is quite easy to pass. Successful applicants are considered in individual LGUs, the procedures of which are specified in the LGC 9 : notices of the vacancy should be posted in at least three conspicuous public places for a period of not less than fifteen days, and a personnel selection board needs to be organised. The board is headed by the local chief executive and its members are determined by 5 LGC, Book II. LGC, Sec. 284.
7
The local chief executive is called governor in provinces, mayor in cities and municipalities, and barangay captain in barangays. A barangay does not have its own civil service, however. In addition to the local chief executive, the vice local chief executive is also chosen by direct election and serves as the chair of the respective local assembly. resolution of the local assembly, including a representative of the Civil Service Commission, if any, and the personnel officer of the LGU, who would be ex officio members of the board. The role of the board is "to assist the local chief executive in the judicious and objective selection of personnel for employment as well as for promotion, and in the formulation of such policies as would contribute to employee welfare".
10 It is also regulated that applicants with the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the authority are prohibited from being appointed.
11 Contrary to these regulations on recruiting the regular staff, however, other types of staff, such as emergency or casual employees or labourers paid on a daily wage or piecework basis who are hired through job orders for local projects authorized by the assembly, can be recruited by individual LGU without being informed to the CSC. As long as the period of such employment does not exceed six months, the procedure of recruiting these staff is completely left to the local chief executive.
In addition to HRM responsibilities of non--executive staff, the local chief executive is also provided appointing power of managerial staff with approval by the local assembly. The managerial staff members serve as department heads within the LGU. It is observed that those in the technical sectors, many of whom have had a long--term career as local civil servants, are not necessarily political figures, though the administrator that takes care of daily LGU management is often a political appointee nominated by the local chief executive.
As illustrated above, the local chief executive is allowed to have massive power after the decentralisation reform, including authority over the local civil service management. Just as is typically argued by critics of decentralisation reform, it is of concern in the Philippines that the reform lets political clans, which are often associated with the national politicians, dominate power in local politics, and thus, voices of local residents are not reflected in local policies despite the initial intension of the reform (Turner, 1998) . The central government has set rules and regulations to prevent misconduct, but supervision of compliance is not strict, which allows the chief executives to exercise their power at their own discretion.
Case 1: City A
City A is the capital city of one of the four provinces in Bicol region of the Philippines, 10 LGC, Sec.80.
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LGC, Sec.79. and its major industry is rice and root crop agriculture. While half of the city's land is used as agricultural land, population wise, a number of residents are employed in the service and trading sectors around the city centre. Around 550 regular staff works at the city council.
At a glance, the national regulations regarding recruitment and selection are followed in a right manner in the city. However, through further interviews it became evident that the compliance of HR--related rules is actually superficial. The personnel selection board is organised and the regulated procedure of recruiting the regular staff is followed under the board, but the board members are not involved substantially in the actual selection judgement. All they do is sign the form prepared by the chief executive office. Hence, the personnel officer confessed that "the number one applicant is not hired". As long as the applicants meet the required qualification, the decision is based on political factors rather than objective criteria.
Political intentions also influence recruitment of non--regular staff. In addition to the 550 plantilla staff, the city hall hires so many 'job orders', or short--term employees, the number of which is not even counted. It was easily observed that the number is excessive because so many staff members, usually young ones, just sit down at the office for the whole day without doing anything apart from chattering with each other. The researcher could correctly identify who are the regular staff members and who are not by seeing if the person has any documents to work on. These job orders serve in the hall for a short term with a limited amount of money, and are traditionally hired by the mayor "because of political reasons". More precisely, the posts are not there to hire personnel on a demand basis, but are to be used as a political means to bolster supporters when their relatives are unemployed, as is described in a statement by an interviewee: "The mayor accommodates them even though the salary is low. . .but he needs to help them".
In this way, embedded nepotism in recruitment and selection was observed in the city. It seems to be, however, not an exceptional case in the country. The interviewees frankly confessed the realities of management practices in the city council to the researcher, with the excuse that it is common in any other local government. Academic work also confirms this point, as in Tapales, Padilla and Joaquin's (1998:211) report: "In the case of LGUs that do not have formal classification and pay plans, jobs may be filled depending upon the needs of the local public service, but more often, through the discretion of the local chief executives and/or local councils."
Case 2: City B
City B is one of the oldest cities in the Philippines, established by Spain in the late 16th century (Robredo, 2006) . Since then, it is said to have thrived as a centre of "trade, education and culture" in the Bicol region (City B, n.d.) . Nonetheless, the majority of its land is still used for agriculture, apart from the central area of the city centre where shopping malls, bus terminals and offices have been built. The city council is headed by a renowned mayor and consists of 497 regular staff and 488 non--regular staff.
In City B, national regulations on HRM are rigidly implemented. Recruitment procedures are followed by the personnel selection board, which is organised by the administrator, personnel department head, department head of the concerning vacancy, two local assembly members, a representative of employees association and a chairman of the city's employee empowerment program called Productivity Improvement Program (PIP). Having extended members beyond the national requirements in the personnel selection board, it can be confidently stated that their recruitment and selection is completely fair. They are even equipped with their original approach in recruitment. The personnel office of the city had developed a document called Rating Sheet of Applicant, a checklist using a five--point scale, which includes the following sections:
-Education and training -Work performance -Experience and outstanding achievements -Psycho--social attitudes and personal traits -Potential
The sheet is filled out by the personnel selection board members in the selection interview, in which situational questions are asked. Owing to this list, the board members have standardised judgement criteria and the applicants can be objectively compared. The decision is made by the board and passed to the mayor for his approval.
Actually, the city council had been taking HRM issues quite seriously for the past decade under the mayor's initiative. The PIP, mentioned above, was the starting point for the city council to keep the focus of HR. The program was introduced, according to the book written by the mayor at the time, to get officials away from the mind--set of a "traditional mode of public service" (Robredo, 2006:37) with a belief that it would be a crucial change to make city hall more efficient. For this purpose, office--wide aptitude tests were implemented to put the right people in the right places. This program was later taken over by a customer--orientation program that received an international donor's support. Encouraged by the mayor, the head of the personnel department has been proposing inventive HR practices, not just limited to recruitment and selection, seeking increased motivation of the personnel and for work efficiencies. These include the employees' satisfaction survey as well as the staff's evaluation of the mayor and management officers.
As shown above, in City B, where the significance of HRM has been emphasized by the chief executive, nationally set arrangements on recruitment and selection are respected and even developed with their own capacity. However, the possibility of paternalistic recruitment of non--regular staff cannot be denied, even in this forward--thinking city council.
Empirical Observations in Thailand
Practices of Recruitment and Selection in Decentralised Local Government
In Thailand, the authorised decentralisation process is considered to have been started by the Thai People's Constitution of 1997 (Haque, 2010 , Nagai and Kagoya, 2008b , Nagai et al., 2008a ). The constitution was followed by two decentralisation--related legislations: the Decentralisation Act of 1999, and the Local Public Personnel Administration Act of 1999, in which new doctrines and devices to support decentralisation were introduced. As a result, local government became the main service provider for the citizens (Green, 2005, Pallangyo and Rees, 2010) .
The local government of Thailand is composed of two tiers of local entities: provinces and the lower level of local government, such as municipalities. While the central and provincial administrations belong to the same bureaucratic system, the local administration has diverged. More precisely, the provincial authorities have been deconcentrated rather than devolved by the central government, and thus they function as local branches of the line ministries. On the other hand, the local government has separated its personnel administration and bureaucratic system, although they are still supervised by the central government.
The local chief executives, directly elected by the constituencies of their jurisdictions, are provided every kind of authority and responsibility of local administration, including HRM within the local office, as well as budgeting of the local entity.
12 While their authority of personnel decision--making is clearly defined in the Local Public Personnel Administration Act of 1999 and the Act on Local Councillors and Executive Administrator Election of 2002, decisions made by the local chief executive still require approval of the Provincial Committee that functions as an administrator of personnel in the jurisdiction of the respective province. 13 Applicants of the local government need to pass the examination, which the local government of concern prepares by itself. In case the local government cannot manage to set their own examination, they can request for a set of examinations from the central government or a third party, such as a university. The examination results would be the primary criteria of judgement. Although the examination is left to each local government, recruitment and selection practices should actually follow the central government's guidelines, which regulate how to arrange the exam, how to set the committee for the examination and how many days the process should be. The criteria of each job and applicant qualification are also set by the central government.
The committee is gathered and set in accordance with the local government's legislation. Just like the case of the Philippines, there are different tracks to get to the local government. For example, contract workers are hired at the local government's discrepancy. These workers serve mainly in non--administrative roles, such as janitors, and usually, whenever the administration is changed, they are all taken over by the new chief's people.
Therefore, in Thailand, local chief executives are allowed to have various authorities including those of HRM. Nonetheless, recruitment and selection procedures of the local civil service are actually designed and planned in detail by the central government. Furthermore, in 2010, the local officers requested that the central government set national common examinations for recruitment, rotation and promotion. Such a request was proposed because they felt that the current recruitment and selection system may legitimate paternalistic bias and find it more secure to have national standards. Given this proposal, the Thai government has been considering the change
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The local chief executive is called mayor in municipalities and president in provinces. of the current system. For the central and provincial government, 'recentralisation' of local civil service management would alleviate their burdens of supervision.
Case 3: City C City C is located in Songkhlaa province in the southern part of Thailand. The scale of its budget is quite large because of the mayor's connection with upper level governments. In terms of HRM of the city, especially the recruitment and selection procedure, the decisive power is all in the hands of the mayor. It was rather significant that when the mayor got to the office, the critical positions within the city were all changed. Rotation is also implemented based on the mayor's demand. It affects not only the higher level officers but also lower level officers including drivers, who may be transferred to even more inferior jobs. Even if one can manage to keep one's position, it often happens that every crucial task is allocated to other personnel who are more akin to the mayor. One interviewee stated: "I have been working as a fiscal and finance director for three years and I have never been assigned by this mayor to the jobs which require decision making". An HR officer honestly confessed that many of the staff are unmotivated for their job under such conditions.
External factors, such as politics at the national or provincial level, also affect recruitment and selection for city positions. For example, provincial politicians ask the mayor to allocate his friends or relatives to a specific position in the city. The mayor responds to the request and gets some budget benefits in return as gratitude.
Therefore, in City C, HRM is completely dominated by the mayor, who conducts paternalistic and unfair operations of civil service management. Such situations severely affect the motivation of those in the civil service.
Case 4: City D
City D is a medium--sized city in the Nakhon Pathom province in the central region of Thailand. Recently, the area has been modernized, and thus manufacturing, real estate business and trading have come to be the vital industry of the city. The population has also increased by accepting migrants from all over Thailand. In the city office, there are 170 staff members.
The mayor of City D is renowned for his straightforward management style. Recruitment and selection for city positions are completely merit based. Any vacant positions are announced in public and the applicants who have passed the examination are shortlisted for further consideration. Only those who originate from the region are prioritised. One HR administrator who accepted an interview showed confidence that the applicants are selected in a fair manner. However, there is a rumour that once a relative of the mayor applied to the city office and passed without the formal recruitment process.
In City D, performance evaluation for the officers is conducted twice a year to be referred to during the internal recruitment and selection process. Any vacancies available for the existing staff are announced and advertised in the city office, so that any eligible officers who would like to get promoted or rotated can apply for the position. It was explained by one interviewee that the mayor's straightforwardness could even smooth relationships with upper level governments. Politicians at the provincial level trusted in the performance of the mayor, because most projects and budgets assigned to City D have been accomplished. Therefore, they hardly request the favour of nepotistic employment from the mayor.
In this way, the mayor of City D has established the norm of transparent operation and ensures that it is supported even by the external parties, although the norm may not be maintained 100% of the time.
Comparative Analysis
Based on the observations in the two countries, this section will make a comparative analysis. First, policy arrangements on HRM under decentralisation in the Philippines and Thailand are addressed. As shown above, in both countries the local chief executives seem to have been provided excessive power to influence many aspects of local governance, and HRM of the local civil service is not an exception. In terms of recruitment and selection, unfair screening through nepotism is a commonly reported and actually observed problem in both countries. Nonetheless, closer observation of each system and its implementation reveals the differences of these two cases, especially in role--sharing between the central and local governments. In the Philippines, a competitive examination is set by the national government for LGU applicants and the LGC regulates the basic procedure of recruitment and selection. The CSC at the national government also supervises LGUs by setting related regulations and guidelines. As described in the case observations, however, examination results are not the primary criteria of recruitment and selection, and compliance of these centrally--set regulations are not strictly monitored in practice. The capacity of LGUs to recruit temporary staff that are exempt from these regulations can also be a means of paternalism. On the other hand, in Thailand, although arrangement of employment examinations is left to each local government, procedures of the examination, as well as criteria of recruitment and selection, are all instructed by the central government. Implementation of these centrally--set rules and regulations is monitored by the committee of the respective provincial government. The structure of this monitoring arm is similar to that of the CSC in the Philippines, but the level of intervention is quite different. While the CSC functions as a steward, the committee of Thailand goes further to be an auditor of the local government's implementation of central rules. As such, discretion of Thai local governments on HRM might be smaller than their Filipino counterparts.
Facing the corrupted implementations of the regulated arrangements, the responses of the two countries have also been different: While the government of Thailand has been gradually shifting its attitude towards 're--centralisation', such as through moving the authority to arrange recruitment examinations back to the central level, the Philippines has not made any such correction on its principle of decentralisation. What is interesting in Thailand is that such a tendency seems to be supported not only by the central and provincial government officials that may want to regain their authorities and to reduce their duties of supervision, but also by some of those in the local government that feel uneasy being self--sustaining, especially considering corrupt situations. In other words, they have strong confidence in the central authority's capacities rather than in their own bosses. This is indeed in contrast to the local governments of the Philippines, which are likely to see their discrepancies on HRM issues as given.
This gap may be explained by the historical backgrounds of the two countries. As mentioned earlier, in the Philippines, local political entities have been enjoying a certain level of autonomy since long before the decentralisation reform. Meanwhile, Thailand has a long history as a united kingdom, in which local administration is under the control of the central government, and its decentralisation reform initiative launched in relatively recent days is mainly targeted at fiscal problems. As far as efficiency of administration is concerned, devolution that could put an extra burden on the higher levels of government might produce inefficiency. In the case of the Philippines, decentralisation reform was a part of the democracy campaign through the 'Peoples' Power Movement', and therefore, re--centralisation is unlikely to be supported by anybody in the country. In developing countries, decentralisation reform is often associated with political rather than administrative decentralisation, as referred to in the theoretical review. The Philippines may be a good example of such a case where the political aspects of decentralisation reform are striking. Besides, political institutions might also affect the issue.
Despite different policy arrangements in these countries, findings from empirical observations in case cities are more or less similar, including both negative and positive aspects. Negative findings in City A and City C confirm the typical concerns of corruption within the local government under decentralisation. In both countries, devolved authorities on HRM matters belong mostly to the local chief executive. It is understandable that in the Philippines, where supervision by the national government is rather lax, governors or mayors easily seek to use their power for political means. In particular, employment of short--term workers is a significant measure to oblige their supporters. However, even in Thailand, whose central government has been keen to monitor local governments, the situation is quite similar. The local chief executives can still pursue their personal interests by doing favours for their relatives or supporters, though perhaps not as openly as in the Philippines. Such murky and unfair recruitment practices might be described as an evidence of 'elite capture', considering employment in the public sector is a local public resource to be distributed to the constituents.
Meanwhile, positive evidences are also assured in both of the countries in the other two cases, City B and City D, which may make significant contribution to the current academic discourses. More precisely, both City B and City D follow the rules and regulations on civil service management set by the central government almost rigidly. In the case of City B, an originally created evaluation sheet was introduced to the recruitment process, which is one step ahead of the existing regulation. In both cities, elaborated HRM is actually not limited to just recruitment and selection but also introduced into other HR practices. Further evidence is found in the fact that they regularly conduct performance evaluations, which are referred to when a promotion is considered. HRM in these two cities consists of a set of HR--related practices that are consistent with each other, rather than an aggregation of isolated practices. This point is evident in these cities because overall HR practices after the entry seem to motivate the staff within the local government offices as a whole system. Furthermore, these cities have succeeded in constructing an atmosphere or so--called norm of observing regulations and being transparent, which is shared and supported by external actors such as donors and politicians who could otherwise encourage the local chief executive to grant them a favour. Interestingly, the local chief executives in these cities, who performed strong leadership in HRM, seem to have been much benefitted by exhibiting such moral behaviours than other leaders managing the government in a typical, traditional and paternalistic way.
Even these cases, however, do not perform perfectly. While employment of temporary staff is still a sanctuary even in City B, it is rumoured that a mayor's relative was accepted for the position without proper screening in City D of Thailand, where employment of close relatives of the authority is not prohibited. Nonetheless, the positive evidences observed in these cases are surely enough to question the validity of the preceding arguments around applicability of the NPM reform and of decentralisation. Neither culturalists' perspectives nor institutionalists' arguments can fully explain why some cities are corrupt while others are not. Provided the same socio--cultural and/or socio--economic conditions, norms of conduct can be achieved in some local governments even without a potential criticism to see these cases as unexceptional.
Concluding Remarks
A comparative analysis of policy arrangements and implementation of the case local governments provides academic and practical implications. First, the detailed analysis of this research illustrates that the HRM systems of the local civil service in the two countries have been arranged in accordance with their own historical, social, and political backgrounds, even though, at a glance, they may look similar by containing the same kinds of issues with corruption. It is particularly clear in their reform directions. In Thailand, with a long history as a united kingdom, the focus is directed more towards efficiencies of the government. On the other hand, in the Philippines, where decentralisation was started as a form of democratisation, central supervision is rather lax and local sovereignty is more emphasised. Indeed, neither situation is the 'correct' answer. This implies there is no off--the--shelf solution of decentralised local government management, and policy arrangements and their problems need to be analysed within the context of each country. In practical application, the typical export of a specific model of reform through international donor assistance strongly requires reconsideration.
Second, the findings of this research confirm the increasing significance of micro--level observations at the local level. For example, the examination of local level practices shows that the grand design of decentralisation reform is not necessarily followed in practice, just as is the case of the Philippines, where guidelines of the national government may not be implemented in a substantial way. It does not mean rules and regulations set by the central are useless. These are still important, as local governments at least try to comply with them even though it is superficial and could be a good reason for HR reform within a local government. Such perspectives of the local level would contribute to the practical field in reconsidering and improving the existing policy arrangements. The motivation factor of local civil service is another point which cannot be understood from a macro--level analysis. In both countries, it was observed that morals and ethics were nurtured through HRM practices and shared by internal and external stakeholders of the local government. This kind of positive spiral of HR practices should be an important issue in designing civil service management.
Academically, part of the findings of the micro--level analysis assure the typically corrupted situations in decentralised local government, which aligns with the concerns of many authors about the applicability of NPM--related reform in developing countries. Devolved processes of the civil service recruitment and selection encourage paternalistic operations, which may be described as a situation of 'elite capture'. Nevertheless, as illustrated above, certainly positive findings are also identified in other cases, and these go beyond the arguments by the preceding authors from culturalism and institutionalism, both of which doubt the decent implementation of decentralisation in developing countries. They cannot fully explain the good practices evidenced in this research.
However, what could be the condition of ethical implementation has not been identified from this research. Strong leadership by the local chief executives is surely one critical condition, but how the local chief executives realise that their ethical conducts would benefit themselves, as in the cases of City B and City D, how the norm is shared by other stakeholders and how such sophisticated leaders are elected by their constituents remain unsolved. To address this issue, examining more local governments as well as HR practices other than recruitment and selection will be the next task.
